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CEPAL REVIEW No. 20 
Is there a fair 
and democratic way 
out of the crisis? 
Some proposals in the 
light of the ECLA 
philosophy 
Adolfo Gurrieri and 
Pedro Saint 
The monetary, financial and trade imbalances which 
have caused or aggravated the present crisis are being 
tackled in most of the Latin American countries 
through conventional adjustment policies. These pol-
icies, which do not always achieve the hoped-for re-
sults, impose enormous economic and social sac-
rifices, not only because of their consequences for the 
system of production, economic activity and the level 
of employment, but also because of their marked ten-
dency to share the costs of the crisis inequitably 
among the different social groups. 
In these circumstances, the authors hold that it 
is necessary to work out other policy systems which, 
being based on different normative principles, will 
make it possible not only to overcome the crisis but 
also to reorient.development so as to correct its struc-
tural problems. This article, which they hope may 
make a contribution to this objective, outlines an al-
ternative policy scheme based on some central ideas 
of the ECLA thinking on development. In section I, 
they describe the main features of the crisis and make 
a critical analysis of the adjustment processes now in 
progress; in sections II and III they set forth in a gen-
eral manner the form of development which they 
suggest and the structural changes which should be 
carried out; in section IV they examine the short-
term policies which should be followed, and the final 
section contains some reflections on the institutional 
order which should govern the political process of 
taking decisions on the crucial issues regarding the 
crisis and development. 
'Technical Secretary of CEPAL Review and Deputy Di-
rector of the ECLA Economic Projections Centre, respec-
tively. Both the authors wish to express their gratitude to 
Claudio Marinho for his comments and suggestions. 
Introduction 
Latin America is currently facing the most seri-
ous economic and social situation since the war, 
in which negative factors of both external and 
domestic origin have combined in a cumulative 
manner.1 In many cases the damage done by 
the crisis affecting the developed countries has 
been aggravated by the application of domestic 
policies which have further intensified the 
economic depression and its effects on employ-
ment and income. These factors have once 
again highlighted the persistence of long-stand-
ing structural problems which the high 
economic growth rates registered in the boom 
years were not enough to overcome. 
The combination of unsolved structural 
problems with unsuitable policies and an un-
favourable external context has led to a crisis 
which has not only been manifested in the 
economic indicators and political events but has 
also struck deeply into the hearts of all. The 
man in the street is overcome by a mixture of 
frustration, confusion and impotence as he sees 
his vital projects collapsing and his hopes for a 
better life disappearing. In the ruling circles, 
perplexity and disorientation reign: under-
standable reactions to a crisis which has shaken 
the most solid beliefs. 
In these circumstances, it is urgently neces-
sary to put forward a set of ideas which could 
form a suitable instrument for interpreting and 
tackling the present problems. In normal times, 
and in the face of normal problems, mankind 
usually follows the paths already traced by pre-
vious generations, and all that it is necessary to 
do in such cases is to hasten one's step by ad-
vancing with greater energy. In times of crisis 
This topic has also been dealt with in a number of ar-
ticles published recently in CEPAL Review. In addition to the 
other articles in the present issue, see in particular Enrique 
V. Iglesias, "The international recession in Latin America" 
(CEPAL Review No. 17, August 1982, pp. 153-162); ECLA 
Economic Projections Centre, "Latin American develop-
ment problems and the world economic crisis" (No. 19, 
April 1983, pp. 51-83); R. Prebisch, "A historic turning 
point for the Latin American periphery" (No. 18, December 
1982, pp. 7-24); and Pedro Sáinz, "Adjustment, redemploy-
ment or transformation? Background and options in the 
current situation" (No. 18, December 1982, pp. 25-44). 
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this is not enough, however: it is necessary to 
know where one is going and, if the wrong road 
is being followed, to correct it. 
Times of crisis, then, call for serious reflec-
tion to clarify the nature and failings of the pre-
vailing situation and also the basic outlines of 
the world it is desired to build. This article aims 
to make a contribution to this task through a 
criticism and a proposal. The criticism is that at-
tempts have been made to tackle the crisis by 
following the broad lines of a type of economic 
and social policy which has failed in practice. 
T h e proposal is for profound changes in this 
type of policy to open up the possibility of a way 
out of the crisis. 
From 1965 onwards, the rapid growth of 
international trade and the economic progress 
of many countries of the region gave rise to 
some questioning of ECLA's assertions regard-
ing the need to change economic relations at the 
international, régional and national levels. From 
the mid-1970s onwards, the abundant external 
financing available accentuated the belief that 
the best solution to the problem of the external 
imbalance would be the liberalization of interna-
tional trade, since it was felt that in orienting 
productive activities, growing importance 
should be given to external market demands. By 
following this path, it was argued, in the long 
run there would be a reduction in external vul-t 
nerability, and an increase in independence of 
the exterior and in economic growth, while ulti-
mately greater social equity would be achieved. 
T h e crisis blew away these hopes, and the 
doubts raised by the ECLA interpretation as re-
gards the validity of this line of approach re-
turned, so that there is now renewed interest in 
the lines of action proposed by ECLA. 
Like all relevant interpretations regarding 
development, the ECLA approach is a combina-
tion of normative principles, suggestions of 
ways of orienting the analysis, proposals regard-
ing empirical facts, and action proposals. The 
tremendous speed of economic and social 
changes makes it necessary to carry out a con-
tinual review of the analytical suggestions, the 
empirical proposals and the proposals for prac-
tical action in order to systematically appraise 
their validity and modify them whenever neces-
sary. The normative principles which are the 
basic elements in the ECLA thinking still retain 
their validity and topicality, however. Thus, the 
need to establish more autonomous and equita-
ble international economic relations, to reduce 
social inequality and improve the living condi-
tions of the poorer strata, to promote economic 
growth in order to absorb the entire labour 
force in productive jobs, and to consolidate a 
more democratic political order is undoubtedly 
just as important today as it was in the past. 
The presentation of these principles in full 
would require considerable more space and ef-
fort than can be given to them in this article, but 
there are some principles of a social and political 
nature which are worthy of special emphasis, 
since, together with economic factors, they have 
always played a leading role in the ECLA ap-
proach. 
Special emphasis must therefore be given 
to the principle of equity, which should be pre-
sent in all social relations. In the international 
field, the emphasis placed on the unequal distri-
bution of technical progress and its fruits has 
been perhaps the most salient feature of ECLA's 
interpretations, and the need for the establish-
ment of an international economic order in 
which these are shared out more equitably has 
been its main watchword. 
The creation of a new and more equitable 
international order in which all countries will 
have a similar level of economic and social de-
velopment, however, calls for profound changes 
in the international distribution of power, so 
that the developing countries can have a greater 
degree of autonomy in their decisions. It is well 
known that the political bargaining power of a 
government vis-à-vis other governments, trans-
national corporations and international organi-
zations will depend largely on the political sup-
port it enjoys domestically, in the region, and in 
the rest of the developing world. Ultimately 
—and this is what the principle of international 
equity aims at— the political power of the de-
veloping countries should be strengthened until 
new rules are established for international 
economic relations. Whatever the progress 
made on the national, regional and interna-
tional political levels, the increase in the degree 
of autonomy of the economies on the periphery 
will encounter a limitation in their external vul-
nerability. In other words, the Latin American 
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countries' relationship of trade and financial de-
pendence has always been a formidable obstacle 
to their achieving greater autonomy, and over-
coming this should be a main policy objective of 
all governments. 
In domestic economic relations, too, the 
principle of equity should occupy a central 
place. Economic development calls for a sus-
tained effort to accumulate capital, and this 
should be carried out through procedures 
which strengthen equity. The incorporation of 
technical progress should be carried out in such 
a way as to reduce regional, sectoral and social 
heterogeneity, and should manifest itself in the 
absorption of the entire labour force into pro-
ductive jobs; the distribution of the fruits of this 
development should also be equitable, to which 
end it is necessary to place emphasis on 
mechanisms tending towards a homogeneous 
distribution of technical progress, as well as on 
direct distribution and redistribution measures. 
Likewise, equity should be expressed through 
wide social mobility which permits all members 
of society to have equal opportunities to reach 
higher levels, to reduce the present social in-
equalities, and to satisfy the elementary needs of 
the underprivileged. 
The principle of equity is also closely 
linked with the principle of democracy, which 
means the establishment of a form of social or-
ín the present situation, it is essential to clarify 
the nature of the crisis. As from 1974, Latin 
America entered upon a period of instability 
and uncertainty: the changes which took place 
in the international context have not all been in-
terpreted in the same way, nor has there been 
unanimity in the forecasts regarding the evolu-
tion of the developed economies. 
There is no doubt that the Latin American 
countries have been affected in very different 
ways by the new external situation and that their 
reactions have also been very different. For 
some of them, such as the net oil-exporters, it 
ganization where there is a more equalitarian 
distribution of power.2 As already noted, at the 
international level equity and democracy must 
mutually support each other, and it was noted 
from the very first ECLA writings onwards that 
behind distributive inequality lay the inequality 
of power among the nations, which would only 
be corrected if the underprivileged nations were 
capable, through their own efforts, of changing 
the economic role and function which they play: 
the new international economic order thus also 
calls for a new world political order. At the level 
of domestic political relations, the initial ECLA 
political position stressed the need to ensure 
that the State gave the right orientation to de-
velopment, but this position already contained 
the seeds of the democratic principle, for this 
State orientation was necessary in order for the 
State institutions to be able, at least potentially, 
to assume fuller representation of the general 
interests of society than the private groups 
which based their influence on the control of 
the economic process. With the passage of time, 
the democratic principle has gradually been 
consolidating its position in ECLA's thinking as 
the experience built up by the Latin American 
countries has repeatedly confirmed that if an 
equitable form of development is desired, this 
must be managed by a democratic State. 
seemed that a new stage of their development 
was beginning in which balance-of-payments 
restrictions would be just a bad memory. Others 
sought to face up to these restrictions through 
bold attempts to transform their structure of 
production so as to substitute imported basic in-
2The development of democratic ideas in ECLA's 
thinking was largely due to Medina Echavarria. See, La obra 
de J osé Medina Echavarria (Selección y estudio preliminar por 
Adolfo Gurrieri), Madrid, Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 
1980. 
I 
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puts and achieve a rapid increase in exports. Fi-
nally, others believed that what had happened 
with oil marked the beginning of a new com-
modity boom and, dazzled by the easy availabil-
ity of external financing, they liberalized their 
economies in the belief that through the old 
trade schemes based on static comparative ad-
vantages they could restore their economic 
growth. 
In spite of this, between 1975 and 1980 
there was a decline in the economic growth rate 
of the region, and if some countries were able to 
maintain their economic growth, albeit at a re-
duced level, this was due to the systematic appli-
cation of policies aimed at securing this objective 
and, above all, to the support provided by plen-
tiful external financing. Most of the countries, 
however, seemed to remain convinced that the 
developed world was gradually getting over the 
increase in oil prices —which was supposed to 
be the main reason for its problems— and that 
it would therefore resume a rate of growth simi-
lar to that of the period 1965-1973 and give a 
similar impulse to world trade. In reality, al-
though they based their approaches on differ-
ent interpretations and applied different poli-
cies, for the most part the governments of the 
region were fairly optimistic towards the end of 
the last decade about the possibilities of expan-
sion offered by the prevailing form of develop-
ment. 
During the 1970s, the ECLA Secretariat 
was entrusted, by a mandate from the General 
Assembly, with the appraisal of the region's de-
velopment every two years. In the midst of an 
optimistic atmosphere, these appraisals always 
struck a discordant note, for although ECLA ac-
knowledged that important progress had been 
made in many fields, it could not avoid pointing 
out, with the far-sighted economic and social vi-
sion which is characteristic of it, that the same 
old structural problems still persisted or were 
even getting worse. Thus, in its appraisal of the 
1970s3 it noted that the three main problems 
faced by the region were: the formation of ex-
tremely inequitable societies, the decline in the 
ECLA, Latin American development in the 1980s, Es-
tudios e Informes de la CEPAL series, No. 5, December 
1981. 
economic growth rate and its consequences for 
employment and income distribution, and the 
persistence of a situation of inequality and vul-
nerability as regards the region's external 
economic relations. 
These appraisals revealed a great con-
tradiction. The region as a whole was increasing 
its production and technological capacity and 
showed that it possessed great productive and 
export potential. This growing capacity was un-
able, however, to solve the structural problems 
of economic growth, social inequality, external 
vulnerability and dependence, and regional dis-
articulation. In short, Latin America was not 
succeeding in integrating itself at either the na-
tional or regional levels. 
It was for these reasons that, in the early 
1980s, the ECLA Secretariat asserted that the re-
gion was in the midst of a process whose trends 
did not show favourable prospects, and it re-
commended the countries of Latin America to 
reorient this process in order to guide it towards 
economic development and social change. 
In view of these appraisals, the problems 
which have arisen since 1981 cannot be inter-
preted as the transient crisis of a form of de-
velopment which could be described as success-
ful in general terms. On the contrary, the nega-
tive effects caused in the external sectors of the 
countries of Latin America by the second oil 
price rise and the economic policy of the Reagan 
administration merely accelerated and aggra-
vated an external crisis which it would at all 
events have been difficult to avoid. There can be 
no doubt that in formulating their economic 
policy the countries must now take as their start-
ing point a structural situation involving more 
serious problems than those of 1980. Even be-
fore that year there were few possibilities of sol-
ving the economic and social problems through 
the prevailing form of development, but now it 
is obvious that the strategies for facing up for 
these problems call for a thoroughgoing review: 
it is the glaring facts themselves, rather than any 
doctrinaire convictions, which now make it es-
sential to carry out this review. 
It is generally accepted that the event 
which set off the present crisis was the extraor-
dinary increase in the external imbalance which 
began in 1981 and later got worse. The truth is 
that there had been a marked external imbal-
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ance of structural origin for years past, the best 
proof of this being the heavy external indebted-
ness which had been accumulated. As far back 
as 1978 the level and profile of this indebted-
ness caused ECLA to conclude that it would be 
impossible in the medium term to maintain the 
trends which had characterized the second half 
of the 1970s in this respect.4 Nevertheless, up 
to 1981 the international banking system con-
sidered that the situation was evolving favour-
ably and thus continued to finance the heavy 
current account deficits. Two contrasting events 
took place, however, when the increase in real 
interest rates, the high level of indebtedness 
(much of it with very short maturities) and the 
interruption in the growth rate {if not a fall in 
absolute terms) of the volume and value of ex-
ports all coincided. These events were the con-
siderable increase in the debt servicing costs, 
and the loss of the confidence which the inter-
national banking system had previously had in 
the solvency of the countries of the region. 
Within the space of a few months, these coun-
tries found it impossible to fulfill their external 
commitments, and they had to begin the diffi-
cult process of renegotiation. 
It is interesting to note, by the way, that the 
possibility that the countries of the region may 
not fulfill these commitments, with obvious con-
sequences for international economic relations, 
is seen by important circles in the centre and in 
Latin America as a dangerous menace striking 
at the very heart of the system. Paradoxically, 
however, during the 1970s and at this very mo-
ment the fact that 40% of the population of 
Latin America is in a state of extreme poverty 
has not caused any alarm at all in these circles. 
In view of the importance attached to the 
external imbalance, the main objective of the 
'adjustment process' has been to balance the 
external accounts, in which task the govern-
ments of the region, the international banking 
system and the International Monetary Fund 
have actively participated. The renegotiation of 
the debt is essential in order to achieve this ob-
jective, and for this purpose the international 
banking system seeks to impose conditions on 
4ECLA, Long-term trends and prospects of the development 
of Latin America, E/CEP AlV 1076(1979). 
the domestic and external policy of the coun-
tries of the region in order to guarantee fulfil-
ment of the new commitments deriving from 
the renegotiation; in order to backup these con-
ditions it usually demands that each country 
should sign an agreement, or Letter of Intent, 
with the IMF as a prerequisite for renegotiation. 
The general tenor of these agreements is 
similar to that of the traditional doctrine advo-
cated by the IMF. As regards the general orien-
tation of development, this doctrine reaffirms 
the supposed advantages of liberalization of the 
economy, reduction of the public sector and ex-
pansion of private enterprise, while it stresses 
the important role which international trade 
should play in guiding the allocation of re-
sources. In its interpretation of the crisis, it em-
phasizes the excessive public spending and the 
unsuitability of the price system, and especially 
of the exchange rate, to the new circumstances. 
As a corollary, acceptable national policies gen-
erally aim to reduce the fiscal déficit and the 
real level of wages, to limit the expansion of 
domestic credit and public sector indebtedness, 
to increase some taxes, to raise or free con-
trolled prices, to eliminate subsidies, to resume 
payment of the external debt, and to achieve a 
surplus on the trade account. When these agree-
ments are compared with those of other periods, 
some change of emphasis is noted, since now the 
central question for the IMF is that of restoring 
the external balance, a somewhat more flexible 
position being adopted on some domestic 
targets such as those connected with the fiscal 
deficit or inflation. 
This orientation of the adjustment proces-
ses was already the subject of much criticism in 
the past.5 Now, however, its recommendations 
seem to be particularly unfortunate. 
To begin with, although we are witnessing 
the profound disarticulation of international 
5Raúl Prebisch, "Monetarism, open-economy policies 
and the ideological crisis", CEPAL Review, No. 17, Santiago, 
Chile, August 1982; Sidney Dell, "On being grandmotherly: 
the evolution of IMF conditionally", CEPAL Review, No. 16, 
Santiago, Chile, April 1981; Octavio Rodríguez, "La teoría 
del subdesarrollo de la CEPAL", Mexico City, Siglo XXI 
Editores, 1980; Samuel Lichtensztejn, "Sobre el enfoque y el 
papel de las políticas de estabilización en América Latina", 
Economía de América Latinado. 1, September 1978. 
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trade and its utter failure as a stimulus for de-
velopment, the IMF gives these facts a merely 
conjunctural character and reiterates its princi-
ples regarding the liberalization of external 
economic relations for the developing countries 
at a time when protectionism on the part of the 
centres is becoming increasingly marked. 
Secondly, it proposes a distribution of the 
costs of the crisis which heavily punishes the 
Latin American countries and rewards the in-
ternational banking system. The renegotiations 
are carried out as though the faulty assignment 
of the loans had been the exclusive responsibili-
ty of the debtors and there were no losses at all 
which should be shared. Furthermore, in these 
renegotiations the banks are applying sur-
charges, fines and costs which raise still higher 
the interest rates and potential profits of the 
banks. Moreover, it is well known that the inter-
national banking system is exerting pressure to 
obtain a State guarantee for credits which it 
originally granted to the private sector without 
any such safeguard.6 
Thirdly, the use made of the economic 
policy instruments seems to be in line with a 
theory of operation of the economy which is no 
longer valid in the present situation. Generally 
speaking, the heterogeneity of the Latin Ameri-
can economies, the consequences of which have 
become still more marked during the crisis, 
makes it necessary to use less homogeneous pol-
icy instruments. Furthermore, as the crisis 
deepens these measures not only prejudice the 
economic flows but may also affect the net assets 
and productive capacity of the economies. In 
these circumstances, it is necessary to exercise 
great selectivity which the orthodox policy in-
struments are incapable of offering, at least to 
the necessary extent. 
Let us take» for example, the effect likely 
to be produced by an across-the-board change 
in the rate of exchange for the entire economy 
which is not accompanied at least by corrective 
measures for particular sectors or groups of op-
erations. On the one hand, this would not make 
it possible to increase the value of commodity 
exports, since if such measures were applied 
more or less simultaneously by all the develop-
6See the article by Robert Devlin in the present issue 
of CEPAL Review. 
ing countries —at a time when the developed 
countries are reducing their demand, running 
down their commodity stocks and establishing 
every kind of protectionist measure— all that 
would be achieved would be to damage the terms 
of trade for commodities without achieving any 
increase in the volume exported. On the other 
hand, in economies which have liberalized their 
domestic and external financial markets and in 
which indebtedness in foreign currency has be-
come widespread, devaluation brings about tre-
mendous upheavals in financial and business 
circles which eventually depress production for 
reasons which have no direct connection with 
demand or with the supply of imported inputs. 
Furthermore, in countries where the capacity of 
the groups affected by devaluation to defend 
their own interest has been underestimated, the 
effect of devaluations have rapidly been passed 
on to prices, and finally, the indirect negative 
economic and social effects of the devaluation 
on production, employment and real wages 
seem to have been underestimated in many 
cases. 
Fourthly, it is extremely ill-advised to seek 
to restrict the action of the State at a time when 
the magnitude of the problems faced prevents an 
adequate reaction on the part of the private sec-
tors, which in most cases are exhausted by the 
crisis and are crying out for public action. 
It is therefore hardly surprising that the 
policies adopted have brought about conse-
quences which are unsatisfactory in many as-
pects. Basically, either because of overestima-
ting the action capacity of governments, underes-
timating the side effects of the policies, or as-
suming unrealistic financing conditions for the 
economies, their results have been far from 
meeting the targets and objectives originally 
proposed. Frequently, the agreements have 
proved impossible to fulfill only shortly after 
they have been signed, thus giving rise to a con-
stant process of signing and revision. 
Furthermore, these policies have shared 
out the external and domestic costs of the crisis 
in an inequitable manner. Reference has al-
ready been made to the unjust nature of the re-
negotiation of the external debt; at the domestic 
level, a large part of the cost has been transmit-
ted to the sectors with the lowest incomes, 
eloquent proof of this being the high prevailing 
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indexes of unemployment and the declines in 
real wages. 
T h e d rop in production, too, has usually 
exceeded the amounts originally bargained for, 
and instead of recovery the first half of 1983 
shows only stagnation or aggravation of the de-
pression. These results clearly reflect the stub-
born effort to achieve a surplus on the balance 
of trade in goods and services. Likewise, the de-
pression is having serious effects on the produc-
tive capacity of the countries. In some cases, fac-
tories have been dismantled, in a process which 
threatens to spread; in others, expansion pro-
jects have been abandoned because of the dis-
couragement felt by businessmen. It is difficult 
to make an accurate forecast of the conse-
quences of this attitude at the moment, but 
there seems no doubt that the policies applied 
have caused an appreciable drop in investment 
in many areas of production. 
Perhaps the consequence of these policies 
with the greatest long-term significance, how-
ever, lies in the aggravation of some problems 
which were already serious before the adjust-
ment process began. The net external indebted-
ness of Latin America is estimated to have in-
creased over the period 1981-1983 by around 
US$ 90 billion, while open unemployment and 
underemployment, which were already consid-
ered to be very serious problems in 1980, are es-
timated to have increased still further. The nat-
ural increase in the labour force due to popula-
tion growth alone represents an increase of over 
7 percentage points, and it should be borne in 
mind that the available information indicates 
that in many cases the absolute number of jobs 
An analysis of the economic and social evolution 
of the Latin American countries from the 1970s 
up to the present crisis permits three main con-
clusions to be drawn: 
a) T h e prevailing form of development 
was already in crisis at the end of the past de-
cade, and the recession of the early 1980s has 
has not only failed to increase but has probably 
actually gone down. Likewise, the drop in the 
levels of investment has put off the possibility of 
attaining in the near future the level of 
economic growth which was considered essen-
tial at the beginning of the 1980s in order to 
give productive employment to the labour force 
and solve the main social problems of the re-
gion. 
Finally, every day the functioning of the 
economies is becoming more costly and ineffi-
cient. The financial problems of the business 
sectors are getting steadily worse as demand 
either fails to recover or else shrinks even 
further, and their main concern is shifted from 
the problems of production to the struggle to 
obtain public resources to insure their survival: 
all considerations of efficiency or serious 
economic calculations lose importance com-
pared with the need to keep their heads above 
water. The State for its part, subjected as it is to 
multiple demands, has often been obliged to al-
locate resources in line with criteria which have 
more to do with the economic and political 
power of those requesting them than a long-
term view of the development process, and this 
has gradually reduced its operative capacity. 
The depression of production activities and its 
sequel have caused an increase in demands for 
new expenditure, while at the same time they 
have eroded both tax and non-tax sources of 
public revenue. In practice, quite independently 
of any ideological positions, everyone is calling 
for State intervention to save the situation, pre-
cisely at the time when the situation is depriving 
the State of resources. 
simply accentuated the external and internal 
difficulties because its cost is being distributed 
unequally, both between the central countries 
and the periphery and within the countries of 
the latter; 
b) The so-called 'adjustment policies' have 
been incapable of coping successfully with 
II 
Towards a new form of development 
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the crisis: indeed, in reality they have instead in-
tensified the structural shortcomings while 
being unable to check the deterioration in the 
situation; and 
c) It would no longer be enough to be able 
to go back to the previous situation, since the 
crisis has increased the severity of some prob-
lems —such as external indebtedness, external 
vulnerability, levels of unemployment and un-
deremployment, faulty income distribution, and 
the deterioration in production capacity— and 
these would not be automatically solved if the 
external situation as regards demand and prices 
returned to what it had been at the end of the 
previous decade. Nor indeed is it desirable to go 
back to that situation, since the crisis has shown 
u p the defects of a form of development which 
the evolution of the 1970s temporarily and par-
tially concealed. , 
It is therefore necessary to reorient 
economic and social policy towards a new form 
of development. This reorientation calls for a 
big effort in many respects, both as regards in-
tellectual reflection and practical action. In the 
field of reflection, there are two main tasks to be 
accomplished: defining the broad outlines of 
the society which it is desired to build, and for-
mulating criteria for advancing in the desired 
direction. In formulating these criteria, account 
must be taken from the very start of the restric-
tions and possibilities of the present moment, in 
t order that the proposals may be given a prag-
matic sense. 
Naturally, this reorientation will only be vi-
able if it can gain the majority support of the 
population, since this is an eminently political 
task. At the same time, however, the usefulness 
of the intelectual tasks should not be underesti-
mated. With a view to collaborating in them, 
some ideas which could possibly be of use in the 
formulation of an economic and social policy in 
keeping with a new form of development are 
put forward in the following pages. 
These ideas, as could hardly be otherwise, 
are of a general nature and are based on the 
principles mentioned in the introduction to this 
article. In translating them into concrete poli-
cies^ the particular characteristics of each coun-
try and the specific problems faced in the short 
run must be taken into account. This has been 
the usual way in which ECLA has formulated its 
suggestions, since although it has striven to find 
common denominators for all the countries of 
Latin America, it has also emphasized the need 
to take account of the differences between 
them, whether of a structural or conjuctural na-
ture. The fact that there are problems common 
to the whole of Latin America justifies the sug-
gestion of general ideas for tackling them, but 
the heterogeneity of situations between and 
within the countries means that caution must be 
exercised in making generalizations, and con-
crete policies must be of a specific nature. 
When most of the countries are suffering 
from economic and social problems and short-
term restrictions of a very similar nature, this 
favours policy proposals of a general type. 
Thus, the generalized nature of the problems 
and restrictions during the present crisis facili-
tates the sketching of some ideas for reorienting 
the process of economic and social change. 
In this respect, two different areas may be 
distinguished: 
a) Structural policies concerning the allo-
cation of resources for long periods in basic 
areas of development where long lead times are 
required in order to obtain the desired results. 
These policies may be considered as inter-
mediate links between the basic principles and 
the short-term policies. Outstanding examples 
of them are the policies regarding changes in 
production, the external sector, employment 
and productivity, capital accumulation and in-
come distribution. 
b) Short-term policies designed to relieve 
the most serious conjunctural problems such as 
the levels of consumption and employment of 
lower and middle strata, the deterioration of the 
production capacity, imbalances in the external 
sector, the financial insolvency of a large 
number of enterprises, public finance problems, 
inflation, and the definition of the role of the 
public sector in the crisis. 
Before briefly setting forth some ideas in 
these two areas, it should be reiterated that the 
establishment of a new form of development is a 
long-term task which must be guided by the 
general principles regarding the formation of 
economically developed societies which are less 
dependent and less vulnerable with respect to 
the exterior, have a more equitable distribution 
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of wealth and income, and a democratic form of 
political organization. 
Although many development strategies ac-
cept these principles, however, they often give 
very different priorities to them. Thus, for ex-
ample, in the last decade many strategies were 
put into practice which considered economic 
growth to be the central objective because they Í 
assumed that it would enable the other objec-
tives to be reached in the long run more or less 
automatically. 
1. International economic relations 
During the 1970s, Latin America changed its 
form of insertion into the international 
framework; in most cases, encouraged by the 
dynamism of international trade and the abun-
dant supply of external financing, governments 
liberalized their international economic rela-
tions. T o a greater or lesser degree, the liberali-
zation schemes were based on a theoretical ap-
proach, advocated by important circles in the 
centres, which gives a central role in the organi-
zation of international trade and production to 
more or less static versions of the principle of 
comparative advantages. In the second half of 
the past decade the belief that liberalization was 
giving very positive results also spread: the vol-
ume of exports was growing at a high rate, and 
thanks to the abundant supply of external fi-
nancing the region was apparently avoiding the 
effects of the decline in growth of the central 
countries. The Latin American countries which 
had been most seriously affected by the first in-
crease in fuel prices seemed to be absorbing its 
impact, while those which had gone further in 
the process of industrialization were managing 
to change the structure of their exports and in-
corporate significant proportions of manufac-
tures and semimanufactures in them. 
All these changes were hailed as successes 
in the progress towards more dynamic incorpo-
ration into international trade and as notable 
advances in the region's defence capacity vis-à-
The development model suggested here, 
in contrast, gives top priority to the principle of 
equity from the start, considering that this is not 
only an end in itself but also an indispensable 
means for advancing towards the achievement 
of the other objectives. It is indeed true that, in 
view of its many-faceted character, equity can 
Í have a decisive influence, on all policy orienta-
tions. 
vis the cycles suffered by the centres. Unfortu-
nately, the present crisis has made it clear that 
although some progress was indeed achieved, 
none of the great efforts made in this direction 
have materially altered the asymmetry of exter-
nal trade relations, while on the contrary the 
new financial relations have increased the re-
gion's external vulnerability ? 
Thus, it can be seen today that almost two-
thirds of the region's exports continue to be 
made up of raw materials and fuels sold to the 
developed countries and that, in spite of the suc-
cess achieved by some countries in their efforts 
to change the composition of their exports, the 
trade of the region as a whole continues to be es-
sentially asymmetrical. The present situation 
has also once again brought out the costs of this 
situation, since the apparent advantages of the 
boom periods are seen to have been more than 
offset by the serious damage done in the periods 
of decline. There can be no doubt that the views 
which the developing countries have repeatedly 
set forth in the International Development 
Strategies, calling for a new international order 
The significance of international economic relations 
in the development of Latin America has been examined 
most searchingly by Anfbal Pinto. See this author's articles, 
"The periphery and the internationalization of the world 
economy: significance and consequences", CEPAL Review, 
No. 9, Santiago, Chile, December 1979, and "The opening 
up of Latin America to the exterior", CEPAL Review, No. 11, 
Santiago, Chile, August 1980. 
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with a more symmetrical distribution of produc-
tion and trade, have gained renewed signifi-
cance after the experience of the 1970s and the 
present crisis. 
By the force of events, the present situa-
tion is restoring the importance of regional in-
dustrialization and trade, since the impossibility 
of relying now on the supply of imports avail-
able in the latter years of the past decade is once 
again establishing a potential space for Latin 
American industry. The trade restrictions of the 
centres are making clear the need to replace 
extra-regional trade to some extent by intra-re-
gional trade. In the latter, special attention must 
be paid to the trade in manufactures, since it is 
here that the biggest supply problems exist, be-
cause of the impossibility of keeping up the pre-
vious levels of trade with the centres and be-
cause of the fact that, as regards raw materials, 
the most obvious opportunities have already 
been exploited. Naturally, the bigger countries 
and the transnational corporations will be better 
prepared, in principle, to take advantage of 
these opportunities, but they should share these 
possibilities with the rest of the region. One way 
of achieving this would be to provide selected 
incentives for the smaller countries to advance 
in the industrial processing of their natural re-
sources and to help their raw materials or ener-
gy sources to find markets in the larger coun-
tries, of which in many cases they are only mar-
ginal suppliers, while above all the possibilities 
offered by compensation machinery should be 
fully used. The basic objective is thus to provide 
a stable long-term horizon for a process which is 
becoming a necessity through the force of cir-
cumstances. 
The asymmetry of the relations in the fi-
nancial field is even more marked. The crisis af-
fecting the international monetary and financial 
arrangements is well known, but a constant fac-
tor in the system seems to be the concentration 
of the decision-making power in the hands of a 
few countries, and especially of the United 
States. The present effects of the monetary pol-
icy imposed by that country are an excellent il-
lustration of the way in which the periphery is 
being affected by that policy without, of course, 
having been able to play any part in its formula-
tion. 
By heavily indebting itself with the inter-
national private banking system during the 
1970s on terms and for periods very different 
from those agreed in the years following the 
war, the region became extremely vulnerable to 
the fluctuations in the international financial 
markets. Thus, although it was able to defend it-
self from the drop in the growth rate of the cen-
tral countries in the second half of the 1970s it 
became very dependent on the fate of a system 
which was beyond its control. As the recession in 
the centres caused a drop in the value of Latin 
America's exports, it became evident that the 
level of indebtedness had gone beyond prudent 
limits. At the same time, the region lost its credit-
worthiness with the private banks, thus bringing 
about a sharp drop in net external financing 
which further aggravated the regional economic 
situation. 
It then became clear that the liberalization 
of financial markets, far from having given rise 
to efficient policies as a result of the predomi-
nance of the private sector in the international 
banking market, had led to the unsuitable use of 
resources and had placed the economies of the 
region in a dramatic external and internal di-
lemma. In contrast with what had happened in 
previous decades, when the resources of the in-
ternational public banking system, which had 
made up the bulk of the external financing, 
were supplied in most cases for carrying out big 
projects on economically viable terms as regards 
repayment periods and interest rates, in the 
1970s the resources were distributed in an un-
suitable manner for the economy, were not al-
ways used to finance investment, and —in the 
last few years— were granted at costs so high 
that few economic activities which were not of a 
speculative nature could expect to pay them. As 
a result, the present crisis spread to all types of 
activities and meant that the adoption of classical 
measures for tackling balance-of-payments 
problems, such as devaluation, brought about 
negative domestic effects of a magnitude never 
experienced since the end of the war. 
In short, the crisis has shown up the fun-
damentally faulty operation of the international 
monetary and financial system. The urgent 
need for change is now clear. In addition to the 
need to share losses, extend repayment periods 
and reduce interest rates —essential measures 
for tackling the external debt problem— it is 
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necessary to put forward once again the many 
proposals which the region made in the past and 
which should be taken up again today with such 
changes as the circumstances make advisable. In 
this respect, the restoration of the dominant 
role of regional and international public bodies 
and the reform of the rules in order to give due 
participation to the periphery are some of the 
central criteria which should guide the restructur-
ing of the international financial system. The 
urgent application of measures to deal with the 
present situation such as the expansion of the 
resources of the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank and the regional banks and the 
increased issue of Special Drawing Rights linked 
with the development of the periphery should 
be only the beginning of a process of reform 
which is vitally needed today. 
2. Changes in production 
The main features of the transformation of 
Latin American production since the war have 
been rapid industrial expansion and the modern-
ization of part of the primary and services sec-
tors. In contrast with what happened in the 
early stages in the developed countries, how-
ever, this progress in the region did not bring 
with it a significant degree of inter- or intra-sec-
toral integration, while the heterogeneity of 
production methods within and between the 
different branches grew still more pro-
nounced.8 Nor did this development bring 
about any significant change in external trade, 
and except for some isolated praiseworthy ef-
forts, external trade continued to be character-
ized by its asymmetry. Efforts to break this 
asymmetry, especially in the field of manufac-
tures, have run into the growing protectionism 
of the centres. These phenomena can largely by 
explained by the unequal distribution of in-
come, which created a domestic market in which 
the demand for most lines of production, taking 
similar per capita income groups, was smaller 
and more dispersed than for the same goods in 
the developed countries. 
8ECLA, Estrategias de desarrollo sectorial para los años 
ochenta: Industria y agricultura, Estudios e Informes de la 
CEPAL series, No. 9, 1981. 
As from 1975, changes are to be seen in 
the nature of the transformation of the system 
of production. The liberalization of the rules 
governing external trade and/or external fi-
nancing, at a time when there was an abundant 
supply of external financing and a sharp export 
drive by the central countries, weakened both 
the incentive to industrialize and economic 
dynamism in general, while strengthening com-
mercial and financial activities, especially those 
connected with external trade. At the beginning 
of the 1980s, the need to restrict imports al-
ready bore witness to the increase in external 
vulnerability, and in 1982 the most serious de-
pression of production since the end of the war 
took place. 
The great influence exerted on the struc-
ture and evolution of production by income dis-
tribution and by the form of insertion of the re-
gion into the external economy are thus obvi-
ous. 
The policies aimed at changing the system 
of production which should prevail in a new 
form of development should be based essen-
tially on the principles of greater equity and au-
tonomy and less external vulnerability. Consid-
erations of distributive equity should guide the 
public and private accumulation effort and the 
restructuring of the installed capacity. Support 
for peasant agriculture and for the types of in-
dustry and services supplying goods for the 
broad masses would impart a new structure to 
employment which, together with the adoption 
of income distribution measures, would gener-
ate national demand compatible with a more 
homogeneous and less vulnerable structure of 
production. 
Demand would be concentrated on fewer 
production, which should be less complex tech-
nically and should therefore call for fewer im-
ported inputs. This would facilitate greater con-
centration of the industrial effort on groups of 
products of widespread use, with greater verti-
cal integration of supply. In this way, industry 
could supply an appreciable proportion of 
domestic demand and at the same time reduce 
the asymmetry of trade in industrial products 
with the exterior. Public consumption, espe-
cially of goods and services generally destined 
for groups of lower income and, in particular, 
those living in situations of extreme poverty, 
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should naturally play a central role in the new 
structure of demand. 
A new form of insertion into the interna-
tional and regional economy would also help to 
reorient the transformation of production. Ex-
ternal restrictions have already significantly af-
fected the level of imports, and everything 
seems to indicate that these restrictions will 
largely persist in the next few years. This con-
sequently opens up a new opportunity for im-
port substitution processes. If these processes 
are combined with greater regional integration 
and with domestic markets which are in line 
with more equitable income distribution, then 
their influence and scope will be broader than 
those of the period after the war. Furthermore, 
if the region manages to change the protec-
tionist rules currently governing international 
trade, it will be able to give a higher degree of 
processing to the primary products which it ex-
ports. 
The experience of countries which are 
now developed shows that an effort of this type, 
although calling for persistence, is no pipe 
dream. Indeed, in certain lines of industrial 
production some Latin American countries 
have had considerable success where their 
domestic markets are big enough and when they 
have made persistent efforts to enter world 
markets. 
The transformation of production thus 
proposed calls for a physical and industrial in-
frastructure and financial support which only 
the State can make possible. If public action 
were concentrated on these broad tasks and the 
necessary resources were made available, con-
siderable successes could be achieved. 
In this respect, the regional demand for 
capital goods such as those connected with 
transport of energy generation offers great 
prospect for the efficient substitution of imports 
at the regional level. The complexity which 
characterizes industrial development will make 
it necessary to accompany the traditional mea-
sures to promote the sector with others con-
nected with programmed public sector pur-
chases, the creation of long-term financing sys-
tems, avoidance of the acquisition of foreign 
technology in 'packages', and promotion of the 
participation of regional engineering skills in 
the design of factories and production prog-
rammes. 
3. Economic growth and the absorption 
of the labour force in productive work 
Among the most decisive economic and social 
criteria for guiding the long-term policies to 
deal with the crisis, special consideration must 
be given to the need to give productive employ-
ment to the largest possible proportion of the 
labour force. One of the most stubborn prob-
lems in the development of Latin America has 
been the inability of economic systems (to vary-
ing extents, depending on the countries) to give 
productive employment to all persons of work-
ing age who are looking for jobs. As a result of 
this, unemployment, underemployment and 
over-manning persist, the latter especially in the 
tertiary sector. The causes of this problem are to 
be sought in the scanty relative dynamism of the 
economic process, the structural heterogeneity 
of the system of production, and the rapid 
population growth rate. This latter, furthered 
by economic and social development itself, 
which has contributed so notably to the reduc-
tion of mortality rates, has made it very difficult 
to absorb the whole working population in pro-
ductive jobs. This is not only because the Latin 
American population growth rate is one of the 
highest in the world, but also because its conse-
quences as regards the increase in the labour 
force still manifest themselves many years after 
there has been a drop in fertility. Furthermore, 
rapid urbanization has changed the distribution 
of the labour force, highlighting in urban areas 
problems which were less evident in rural zones. 
The present crisis has aggravated this 
problem in at least two main ways: it has pre-
vented the region from continuing the previous 
rate of absorption of labour in productive jobs 
—which, although insufficient, was nevertheless 
quite high—9 and it has stimulated technical 
change in the developed centres tending to-
wards the more intensive use of capital. In many 
of the central countries there is a clear aware-
9Norberto E. Garcia, "Growing labour absorption 
with persistent underemployment", CEPAL Review, No. 18, 
Santiago, Chile, December 1982. 
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ness that one of the main causes of the crisis at 
present being experienced is the slackening in 
the growth rate of productivity, and that an in-
crease in this rate is an essential condition for 
emerging from this situation. Whatever the 
economic mechanisms used to achieve this ob-
jective, there can be no doubt that sooner or 
later they will take the form of technological 
changes which involve the highly intensive use 
of capital, and they may even give rise to a third 
industrial revolution. 
Latin America will be no stranger to these 
changes from the point of view of consumption, 
and it should not be so from the point of view of 
being a producer and exporter of manufactures 
either; if it wishes to gradually increase its im-
portance as an exporter of these goods, it must 
make enormous efforts of accumulation, mod-
ernization of its physical resources, and training 
of its labour force, at least in those sectors where 
it currently has relatively greater potential, in 
order to go along with the technological changes 
which are looming up on the horizon. 
How are these enormous and unavoidable 
efforts to reactivate crisis-wracked economies 
and to participate in the new forms of produc-
tion which are taking shape in the developed 
countries to be reconciled with the need to give 
productive employment to a large and, for 
many years to come, still growing labour force? 
The experience of the last years has left us 
some lessons in this respect. T o begin with, it is 
necessary to discard once and for all the idea 
that the growth of one or several sectors will au-
tomatically bring with it the development of the 
most backward ones: such automatic 
mechanisms simply have not worked in the 
countries of Latin America, where there is still a 
high degree of sectoral, social and regional 
heterogeneity in the distribution of levels of 
productivity and average income. 
In view of these facts, some development 
strategies have been formulated which have 
sought to promote the 'spearhead' sectors and at 
the same time establish procedures for distribu-
ting part of the surplus generated in these 
among the rural and urban groups which were 
being increasingly left behind, with the aim of 
improving their living conditions. These strate-
gies do have the positive feature of being con-
cerned to combine economic growth with social 
equity, but they do not give due attention to the 
fact that the firmest foundation for equitable 
distribution of the fruits of development lies in 
the systematic effort to overcome structural 
heterogeneity by raising the productivity of the 
entire labour force. In this respect, strategies 
aimed at coping with such complex demands as 
those for economic growth in an era of pro-
found technological changes and absorption of 
all workers into productive jobs in a period of 
rapid growth of the labour force must at the 
same time be able to give very selective stimula-
tion to this growth and establish deliberate ar-
rangements whereby part of the surpluses gen-
erated by the most dynamic branches can help to 
raise the levels of productivity and living condi-
tions of those lagging behind. In this respect, 
giving high priority to agricultural development 
in line with the potential of the sector itself and 
of its population is both vital and urgent for 
most of the countries of Latin America. 
4. Capital accumulation and income distribution 
Another fundamental aspect of the policies 
which should be applied in order to emerge 
from the crisis and reorient development is that 
regarding the domestic accumulation of capital, 
since it is clear that external saving will not have 
the dynamic role in the immediate future which 
it had in past years. As regards the volume of 
capital which should be accumulated, the an-
swer is very simple: as much as is socially and 
politically possible. Even before the present 
crisis the ECLA appraisals considered that the 
effort being made in this respect was not suffi-
cient to give productive employment to the en-
tire labour force and to improve the living con-
ditions of the neediest citizens, and the deterio-
ration which has taken place in the situation 
since then means that efforts must now be re-
doubled. 
In reality, the most crucial questions re-
garding capital accumulation are of a political 
nature: which social groups are to bear the bur-
den of this accumulation? who is it to benefit? 
The recent years offer some very useful 
lessons in this respect too, which make it neces-
sary to discard conventional answers to these 
questions because they tend to be inequitable, 
inefficient and undemocratic. When the respon-
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sibility for domestic saving and productive in-
vestment fell on the economically powerful 
groups, the expected results were not attained, 
because these groups often preferred to engage 
in conspicuous consumption imitating the life 
styles of developed countries, speculation and 
unproductive investment. It is therefore neither 
socially just nor economically efficient to seek to 
increase domestic saving through conventional 
policies aimed at transferring income from the 
rest of society to the wealthy groups in order 
that the latter may invest in priority economic 
and social areas in line with the demands of the 
crisis and the needs of development. Further-
more, in many Latin American societies it does 
not seem that these policies could any longer be 
easily applied, because of the defence capacity 
of wage earners, the already very considerable 
reduction in the real income of the latter as a re-
sult of stabilization policies, and the existence of 
democratic governments which rely on these 
wage-earning groups for an important part of 
their political support. 
It is also important to note that conven-
tional policies are usually imposed as if they 
were the expression of objective and neutral 
technical criteria: the impression is fostered that 
the social distribution of the costs involved in 
them should be accepted as the inevitable man-
ifestation of a natural law. There can be no 
doubt that there are important technical criteria 
which deserve to be taken into consideration, 
whatever the socio-political structure in which 
the policies are applied, but the social distribu-
tion of the costs is above all a question of politi-
cal decisions: presenting it as a purely technical 
question means concealing the political content 
of the decision. 
It is therefore necessary to increase the de-
gree of transparency of the entire process of de-
cision-making on such crucial issues. Such 
greater transparency of the technical and politi-
cal aspects would enable all social groups to de-
fine their interests and orientations clearly, thus 
laying the bases for a social compact which 
would reflect a higher level of political rational-
ity and democracy. 
If conventional capital accumulation poli-
cies are to be rejected for the above reasons, 
then what path should be followed? 
As regards the social origin of the re-
sources, it should be emphasized from the very 
beginning that both the measures on accumula-
tion and distribution and those on fiscal and 
monetary matters should be taken within the 
framework of a policy of general austerity, since 
the crisis and development call for inevitable 
sacrifices. The austerity should be equitably 
shared, however, that is to say, it should de-
mand more from those who have more, while its 
demands should gradually be reduced in prop-
ortion as the level of family income goes down. 
This policy of procurement of resources should 
be accompanied by dynamic redistribution so as 
to raise the income of the lower strata as a mat-
ter of priority, when economic evolution per-
mits this. 
As regards the non-conventional mechan-
isms of appropriation and allocation which 
should be used, the experience of some capital-
ist central countries suggests that emphasis 
should be placed on the tax system; in the most 
successful cases, a combination of high 
taxes on profits and on the consumption of the 
high-income groups and strong incentives to 
selectively oriented productive investments has 
been used. Even if the tax instrument could be 
effectively used in Latin America, however, it 
should be noted that altough the path chosen 
by those countries has helped to promote ac-
cumulation and economic growth in them, it has 
also caused great concentration of the means of 
production, and in the long run this could 
create important obstacles to the democratic 
process. 
These considerations show how important 
it is that the capital accumulation process should 
also help to create and strengthen equitable dis-
tribution of wealth; if conventional and Keyne-
sian policies have tended to concentrate this, 
those which should be applied now should pro-
mote the reduction of such trends. Measures 
should be taken in two mutually supporting 
areas to this end. 
On the one hand, the State should play an 
important role in the processes of appropriation 
and allocation of resources, but for this purpose 
it is essential that it should be democratized, that 
is to say, that the decisions taken in these mat-
ters should be the result of institutional proce-
dures in which the whole community feels itself 
to be fully represented. In reality, the State has 
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not always wanted or been able to appropriate 
the necessary resources for accumulation, and 
frequently it has not allocated them in line with 
the needs of development. This behaviour is 
explained above all by the fact that in the appro-
priation and allocation of public resources there 
is often a struggle between different élites seek-
ing to orient these resources for the benefit of 
their own needs and interests rather than those 
of society as a whole. The democratic machinery 
should prevent the exertion of any decisive in-
fluence on these processes by such sectoral 
élites, whether private or public, civil or mili-
tary. 
It has already been noted that the economic and 
social situation of Latin America as a whole in 
the first half of 1983 does not, in general terms, 
show any signs of improvement over 1982. In-
deed, in many cases it has deteriorated in such 
aspects as unemployment, inflation or the de-
cline in productive activity. The living condi-
tions of most of the population have deterio-
rated even more, which is a serious matter, espe-
cially bearing in mind the low level at which they 
already stood at the beginning of the 1980s. As 
already explained, the adjustment policies have 
not had the desired results. In these cir-
cumstances, there is generalized awareness that 
it is urgent to take measures in the short term; 
thus, although formulating a new type of de-
velopment takes a long time, measures in keep-
ing with the new priorities should be taken soon, 
above all in order to bring some relief as a first 
priority to the situation of the most under-
privileged strata. In addition, and simulta-
neously with the application of these priority 
measures, others should be taken in the areas 
where it appears to be essential to bring about 
some improvement or change the line of ap-
proach. The most important of these areas con-
cern the defence of the national economy at the 
popular level and the establishment of a situa-
tion as regards domestic prices and financing 
On the other hand, the public allocation of 
resources for capital accumulation does not 
mean that there should be a tendency towards 
State control of the production apparatus. In-
stead, in the new form of development different 
forms of organization of production combining 
State, private and co-operative ownership and 
management should exist side by side. Democ-
ratization of the State, co-management in State 
and private enterprises, and co-operative forms 
of production are those which give the greatest 
hopes of true democratization of ownership and 
management, and should therefore be pro-
moted in a priority manner.10 
which will enable an acceptable level of 
economic success to be achieved in the produc-
tion sector; the procurement of sufficient for-
eign exchange to make possible a level of im-
ports capable of guaranteeing minimum targets 
of production, essential consumption and em-
ployment, and the preservation of production 
capacity in the economic and social infrastruc-
ture and in the sectors governing mass con-
sumption, exports and investments which are 
not very demanding in terms of external re-
sources. 
1. Defence of the national economy 
at the popular level 
The crisis has made the problems of the lower-
income groups still more acute. There are many 
ways in which the effects of the crisis are trans-
ferred to the mass of the people: price rises, 
drops in real wages, increased unemployment, 
and reduction in public expenditure, which, in 
addition to its economic effects, brings about a 
consequent deterioration in educational ser-
vices, health, nutrition, housing, etc. The low-
10Raúl Prebisch, Capitalismo periférico. Crisis y transfor-
mación. Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1981. 
IV 
Short-term policies 
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income non-wage earning groups are also af-
fected by the difficulties which exist in transfer-
ring monetary income to them to compensate at 
least partly for their problems, and they also 
suffer when, for budgetary reasons, it is decided 
to do away with subsidies or price controls in re-
spect of basic consumer items such as bread and 
widely used fuels. While acknowledging the va-
riety of situations registered in the different 
countries, it nevertheless seems essential to de-
sign emergency programmes to help the groups 
most seriously affected by the crisis. 
Thus, it is urgently necessary to make 
changes in incomes policy. Measures of a 
macroeconomic nature aimed at reducing pub-
lic expenditure should be replaced —or com-
plemented, depending on the particular cases— 
by others which increase the expenditure 
aimed at certain groups and reduce that 
oriented to others. In this respect, wage and 
price policies should be handled with great 
selectivity. The drop in the real wages of the 
lowest income groups has drastically reduced, in 
many cases, the demand for goods which have a 
low import content and involve high labour den-
sity; in contrast, other groups with more capac-
ity to stand up to the crisis —partly because of 
the possibility of resorting to income drawn 
from their wealth— have kept up a form of de-
mand which seriously affects the balance of pay-
ments and generates little employment. In gen-
eral it would be desirable to achieve some recov-
ery in the real wages of the lower income 
groups, but the wide variety of national situa-
tions does not permit of generalizations. The 
selective management of prices is also called for 
if it is desired to promote one particular 'shop-
ping basket' of goods rather than another and if 
it is desired to defend the groups whose income 
does not come from formal occupations. Natu-
rally, increasing employment —especially that of 
less-skilled workers— will play an important role 
in improving family income. At the same time, it 
is necessary to pay special attention to the de-
fence of employment and wage rights won 
through trade-union activities; in many cases 
the high level of unemployment has created 
suitable conditions for the employer sector to 
reduce real wages and employment in unaccept-
able ways. 
The consumption of the lower income 
groups is moreover usually considerably influ-
enced by public expenditure, and the latter 
should therefore be handled with extremely 
selective criteria. On the one hand, investments 
should be selected with a keen eye to employ-
ment criteria, while on the other, as regards 
public consumption, it is desirable at least to 
keep up the level of that destined for the groups 
most severely affected by the crisis. There are 
cases where the supply of mass consumption 
products depends on imports or State subsidies; 
in these cases, there is every justification for the 
execution of programmes aimed at guarantee-
ing such supply by giving access to these goods 
to the poorest sectors and avoiding the seepage 
of subsidies to other social groups. 
The same policy criteria should be applied 
as regards social public expenditure. In a crisis 
situation it will be very difficult to increase the 
proportion of such expenditure in the total, so 
that policies should be aimed at redirecting its 
allocation in order to make it more equitable. 
Social policies in Latin America have been 
criticized for many years past on the grounds that 
they have tended to favour the middle strata in 
particular, to the disadvantage of the lower 
strata. If a change in this orientation in line with 
criteria of greater equity was already necessary 
before the crisis, then it is much more so now, 
when resources are tighter and it is not possible 
to satisfy the needs and demands of the poorest 
groups through further expansion of social 
public expenditure. 
2. Domestic financing 
The present crisis has given rise to extremely 
serious domestic financial imbalances. There 
are many situations where it would be impossi-
ble to apply policies aimed at increasing produc-
tion or tackling balance-of-payments problems 
without first of all solving the financial imbal-
ances. This problem stems from two main 
sources: external indebtedness, and domestic 
policies. 
The main features of the external indebt-
edness are its large size and the fact that the 
credits have been obtained at extremely high in-
terest rates. The ways in which these credits are 
passed on to domestic users vary from country 
to country. Sometimes the dollar or another for-
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eign currency is used as the unit of calculation, 
while in other cases the exchange risk is ab-
sorbed by the State or financial intermediaries. 
Interest rates are likewise dealt with in different 
ways: sometimes they are transferred directly to 
users; in other cases they are fixed by domestic 
financial intermediaries and are considerably 
higher than external rates; while in many cases 
the State subsidizes users by lowering the rates. 
In these circumstances, the sharp devalua-
tions and acute processes of inflation caused by 
the external sector crisis have led to all kinds of 
transfers of wealth and profound changes have 
taken place in the operational situation and net 
worth of persons and enterprises. Some have 
suffered heavy losses, while others have had big 
gains, and this has given rise to liquidity whose 
use is very difficult to control today. 
The situation has also been very diverse as 
regards domestic financing policies. In many 
countries, systems of contracting credits were 
introduced which involved clauses linking the 
debts to foreign currencies, thus making them 
subject to exchange risk. Loans in national cur-
rencies, too, have been granted on very varied 
terms which have included high real interest 
rates, credits indexed to inflation, and negative 
real rates of interest. To the extent that the crisis 
has speeded up inflation or forced devaluations, 
the combination of these elements has also 
brought about substantial transfers between sec-
tors. 
As might be expected, the public budget 
did not remain unaffected by these upheavals. 
In some cases it has absorbed the external prob-
lems of the productive and financial agents and 
has come to the rescue of the most seriously af-
fected sectors in a makeshift fashion and under 
the pressure of events. The reduction in the 
level of activity has brought with it a drop in tax 
and non-tax revenue, while at the same time the 
crisis has been increasing pressure for greater 
expenditure, although many of the adjustment 
programmes seek to reduce this. In these cir-
cumstances, fiscal policy has sometimes been 
handled more in the light of economic and 
political pressures than in line with a pro-
gramme having clear objectives. 
The economic situation has also suffered 
considerable changes at the level of the middle 
and high income groups. Unfortunately, 
speculative investment has been in vogue in 
many countries: there are now appreciable 
amounts of funds in the hands of the private 
sector which move with great flexibility among 
activities connected with speculative sectors, 
emergency loans to the most seriously affected 
sectors at high real interest rates, pressure on 
the foreign currency market, and other invest-
ments of a speculative nature. 
In short, a domestic financial situation has 
been created which is very difficult to handle. 
Frequently, businessmen have been forced to 
replace sound economic calculations with con-
siderations based solely on the need to gain ac-
cess, at any cost, to resources —especially public 
resources— which will enable them to survive; 
many have done this in the hope that future fi-
nancial arrangements will enable them to trans-
fer these costs to other sectors. 
In some countries it is urgently necessary 
to put an end to this situation so that the State 
can recover control of the financial market and 
neutralize the enormous mass of resources 
used to stimulate speculative activities. In order 
to do this, the State must prohibit the pos-
sibilities of speculating (when these exist legally) 
and create one or more preferential long-term 
saving options which enjoy its backing. 
Reduction of the real interest rate is also of 
the greatest urgency, since in some countries 
there are still interest rates which are completely 
out of keeping with any reasonable possibility of 
return. In this respect, however, it is necessary 
to apply a selective criterion regarding credit. 
Its allocation cannot be left in the hands of fi-
nancial groups which are themselves in a com-
promised situation, and it is also evident that not 
all sectors or enterprises can be saved; the estab-
lishment of a reasonable real interest rate is only 
compatible with the forced and selective restric-
tion of demand for credit. 
The public budget also calls for reorgani-
zation. As regards revenue, the conventional 
procurement measures are not enough: policy 
in this field should be aimed at the application 
of measures to procure revenue from the 
groups which still have a high level of consump-
tion and have liquid assets available for specula-
tion. 
Public expenditure, too, should be 
oriented in line with the principle of social 
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equity and linked with the priorities approved 
for the productive sector; it is not possible to 
satisfy the demands of all sectors at once, and 
any attempt in this direction would necessarily 
bring about an increase in inflation caused by 
the bigger fiscal deficits. 
Only a selective financial and fiscal ap-
proach can restore the levels of production, 
budgeting and prices which will make possible 
non-speculative economic calculations: an es-
sential condition for the rational functioning of 
mixed economies in which the private sector has 
an important economic role. 
As already noted, the problem of wages 
and employment constitutes a challenge for the 
inflation control policies which may be adopted 
in the new form of development. There can be 
no doubt that in countries where unemploy-
ment has reached very high levels, this problem 
should be solved before tackling that of the 
drop in real wages; nevertheless, this latter 
problem is bound to arise in all countries when 
designing policy. Keeping real wages within 
limits compatible with domestic and external 
supply is an absolute necessity if it is desired to 
avoid hyperinflation. In democratic societies, 
however, the wage-earning groups can hardly 
be expected to accept a sacrifice comparable 
with that which has been demanded from them 
in the past unless at least two requirements are 
fulfilled: the biggest sacrifice must be made by 
the groups with the highest income, and capital 
accumulation formulas must be applied in 
which the wage-earning groups feel themselves 
to be authentic participants, not only in the sac-
rifices but also in the benefits. 
3. The balance of payments 
There are two short-term priority objectives in 
this area: to reduce as much as possible the pres-
sure of the external indebtedness, and to find a 
way of handling the trade balance on goods and 
services which is compatible with the selective 
policies applied in the production and financing 
areas. 
In the short term, the pressure of the ex-
ternal debt servicing is manifested in two ways. 
One of them, which is of a fundamental nature, 
lies in the impossibility of honouring the short-
term commitments, while the other^which is of 
a formal nature, is connected with the problems 
of living in a situation of constant crisis which 
makes it necessary to have recourse to partial 
negotiations, bridging loans and other 
emergency solutions. 
The problem of the external debt is very 
complex, as are its solutions; when discussing 
the latter, some questions arise which are worth 
setting out briefly: 
i) Should the Latin American countries 
negotiate separately, together, or separately but 
using common criteria? 
ii) Will the transnational banking system 
accept capital losses as the national banks are 
doing at the domestic level? 
iii) Will the renegotiation cover the short-
term credits whose renewal means keeping the 
crisis still latently in being? 
iv) How much net external financing will 
the international public and private banking sys-
tem be willing to provide? 
v) What additional costs in respect of in-
terests, fines, etc., should be accepted in the re-
negotiation? 
vi) How are the results of the renegotia-
tion of the external debt to be passed on within 
the economies? 
vii) Should public backing be given for the 
private external debt? 
viii) Should formulas be applied which 
could relieve the short-term situation, such as 
periods of grace, linking of payments with the 
terms of trade, or other measures connected 
with the value of exports? 
ix) What domestic policy measures should 
accompany the renegotiation, special impor-
tance being assumed in this respect by the ef-
forts to achieve trade surpluses which will help 
pay the cost of recessive policies? 
It is not possible to answer all these ques-
tions, but from the point of view of a new form 
of development some general considerations 
may be mentioned which could serve to orient a 
renegotiation policy. 
On the one hand, the bargaining power of 
governments should be strengthened in propor-
tion as political processes are democratized, 
since it will be clear to creditors that it is impossi-
ble to apply policies which impose new sacrifices 
on the population; a similar effect will be pro-
duced by progress in regional co-operation and 
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integration. On the other hand, the possibility 
of the countries facing up to their debts without 
the foreign banking system accepting any capi-
tal losses or the State giving its backing to pri-
vate debts could only be justified to some extent 
if the renegotiation were sufficiently flexible to 
avoid any accentuation of recessive policies, if 
reasonable periods of grace were given, if real 
interest rates which are impossible to pay except 
through speculative ventures were eschewed, 
and if the creditors agreed to make the payment 
of the debt conditional upon an improvement in 
foreign trade as regards volumes and prices. If 
the negotiations do not include these conditions, 
they will be proposing unrealistic solutions and 
will be placing a millstone around the neck of 
the Latin American countries, with the corres-
ponding social and political consequences. 
At all events, it seems illusory to expect any 
spectacular results in this field in the short term; 
the situation of crisis will continue for quite a 
long time in most of the countries, obliging to 
manage their foreign trade under totally abnor-
mal conditions. 
In the field of international trade it must 
be noted from the very beginning that exports 
are faced with very diverse situations. There are 
a large number of products, especially com-
modities, where export incentives do not pro-
duce any significant effects as regards an in-
crease in the volume or value exported; the 
problem in these cases lies in the depressed de-
mand of the developed countries and the pro-
tectionist measures which they have taken. Con-
sequently, for these kinds of exports a devalua-
tion in real terms or some other financial incen-
tive is normally only translated into an internal 
transfer of resources and has few repercussions 
on the trade balance. For other products, how-
ever, especially those of industrial origin, State 
support may be of great importance, both in the 
negotiations for tackling the protectionism of 
the centres and as regards the application of fi-
nancial incentives which will enable countries to 
maintain and increase their competitiveness. 
Consequently, this field requires different 
measures, and a homogeneous set of measures 
may not therefore be effective. 
Until now, imports have been one of the 
central concerns of adjustment policies, for 
their reduction with a view to achieving a trade 
surplus has been seen as an indispensable ele-
ment for balancing the economy. The means 
used for this are varied: some of them are selec-
tive, such as the prohibition of certain imports 
considered to be non-essential, differential in-
creases in tariffs, or the differential handling of 
the different items in the public budget; others 
are of a general nature, such as devaluations; 
while in some cases, through the financial and 
monetary policies applied, sharp depressions 
have been provoked which have affected the 
economy as a whole. 
According to the new form of develop-
ment proposed here, it is not acceptable to apply 
measures of a homogeneous nature which pro-
voke sharp recessions in production with in-
equitable imposition of the costs mainly on the 
least privileged groups. Such groups, which 
have little wealth to use as a buffer mechanism, 
are severely affected by unemployment or 
drops in real wages. The system of production, 
too, suffers severely from this type of measure. 
It is therefore advisable to apply selective im-
port restriction and export promotion policies 
which are in line with measures of the same type 
taken at the domestic level, all these actions 
being aimed at guaranteeing certain minimum 
levels of production and consumption. 
If policies to increase domestic saving and 
productive activity are applied, the selective im-
port policy must be complementary to these, for 
limitations on consumption by the high income 
groups should coincide with a drop in non-es-
sential imports, and difficulty in importing 
should open the way to import-substitution pol-
icies and greater domestic production activity. 
4. Maintaining production capacity 
It is probably unanimously agreed that it would 
be desirable to increase production and reduce 
unemployment, but there may be doubts re-
garding both the possibility of doing this and its 
consequences. It should therefore be stressed 
that reactivation is both possible and necessary, 
while its concrete significance should not be left 
in doubt. Thus, reactivation is usually used in 
the sense of restoring the previous level of func-
tioning of the economy in all sectors and bran-
ches, but in the present circumstances this is an 
unrealistic aim and attempts to achieve this have 
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brought about a rapid increase in both the 
domestic and external imbalances. 
What is possible, is to reactivate the level of 
production of certain branches, while accepting 
that it will not be possible to reactivate others, 
such as commercial and financial branches 
aimed at supporting the consumption of im-
ported goods by the high income groups. 
The first set of branches of production 
which should be stimulated is that serving to 
satisfy the 'shopping basket' of goods and ser-
vices which form the basis of mass consumption; 
many of the branches of the agricultural sector 
are concrete examples of this. The need to en-
sure in the short term both the supply of goods 
of agricultural origin and the productive ab-
sorption of a high proportion of the rural 
labour force make it desirable to attach priority 
attention to the recovery of this sector. 
Likewise, the physical and industrial in-
frastructure must be preserved: the creative ef-
fort and accumulation of many generations 
The criteria proposed for orienting economic 
and social policy call for firm and deliberate di-
rection on the part of the State. The varied 
political experience of Latin America makes it 
clear, however, that there are no private or pub-
lic mechanisms or institutions which alone can 
ensure the efficient execution and proper orien-
tation of the economic process. There has often 
been a seesaw movement in ideas which has led 
to the State or the market, democratic or au-
thoritarian institutions being presented either as 
a dens ex machina, which solves everything by its 
mere presence, or as the guilty parties responsi-
ble for all political and economic problems. 
This to-and-fro movement is closely re-
lated to the historical process. The crisis of the 
1930s led to generalized pessimism regarding 
the market mechanisms and gave rise to 
politico-institutional arrangements in which the 
State and planning played the decisive role; the 
crisis of these latter elements restored faith in 
which have gone into these constitute a national 
heritage which cannot be sacrificed in the pur-
suit of short-term macroeconomic goals. 
A third group of branches whose produc-
tion should be stimulated are those whose ex-
ports could be affected by their present cost 
structure. Special attention should be given here 
to those manufactures which won markets for 
the region during the 1970s and which must 
now be defended. 
Finally, it is necessary to stimulate invest-
ments which are not only identified with the ob-
jectives of the new form of development but also 
have external financing from international pub-
lic agencies, use few imported inputs or make 
very intensive use of labour. In all these cases it 
is a question of stimulating sectors selected be-
cause of their contribution to the new form of 
development. Thus, the short term is seen as 
the launching period of a new style and not 
merely as a time for the emergency rescue of the 
old form of economic and social administration. 
the virtues of the former, and now again, in 
their turn, these have been deeply discredited 
by the present disequilibria. Similarly, the con-
fidence placed a few decades ago in the mutually 
fruitful relationship between economic develop-
ment and democracy was eroded by the difficul-
ties of reformist and populist régimes and gave 
way to the rediscovery of the assumed virtues of 
social discipline and authoritarianism, which 
now, once again, are threatened by the growing 
impetus of democratic ideals. 
In these circumstances, the present 
economic crisis has once again raised the old 
question of which is the most favourable 
politico-institutional system for promoting de-
velopment and facing up to the aggravated con-
flicts of the present time. If we look back at the 
history of Latin America in search of an answer, 
the initial impression obtained coincides with 
what was stated earlier to the effect that neither 
greater State intervention, nor a return to 
V 
The essential political direction 
IS THERE A FAIR AND DEMOCRATIC WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS? / A. Gurrieri and P. Sáinz 147 
democratic principles, nor much less the pre-
dominance of an authoritarian order or of the 
market laws are sufficient on their own to 
guarantee the proper performance and orienta-
tion of the economic process. The problem of 
the coherence of the economic and political in-
stitutions and processes does not allow of 
simplistic and unilateral solutions, but requires 
instead that each of these institutions should be 
objectively appraised with regard to its achieve-
ments and failures, its possibilities and limita-
tions. 
As is well known, the reappraisal in recent 
years of the role of the market in various coun-
tries of the region was based on the conviction 
that its free operation would guide the main 
economic decisions better, since in addition to 
its supposed virtues in achieving the efficient al-
location of resources and the equitable distri-
bution of income, it was believed that this 
mechanism would avoid abuses of power 
through its impersonal objectivity based on re-
spect for economic laws. 
The economic crisis of the countries which 
placed their trust in the market mechanisms has 
once again revealed the true nature of the mar-
ket, which is simply that of a mechanism subor-
dinated to the existing economic structure. In 
view of this, it cannot direct the process of de-
velopment, since this process has economic, so-
cial and political objectives which deliberately 
seek to bring about changes in that structure. 
The current generalized abandonment of mar-
ket mechanisms in favour of growing State in-
tervention in order to face the crisis is further 
confirmation that while the market may have 
economic and political virtues, these do not in-
clude the power to direct development properly 
or to tackle crises effectively alone. 
Because of the limitations of the market, it 
is essential that the State should have a decisive 
role in the running of the economic process, 
above all in times of crisis. It is important, how-
ever, not to fall into the technocratic illusion 
that the mere fact of State intervention can 
guarantee a reasonable degree of efficiency and 
legitimacy: State intervention in the economy 
can also be inefficient and inequitable. The 
problem is that the State has frequently been 
under the influence of economic and political 
power groups: instead of leading them it has 
been led by them. 
The actual performance of the State and 
the market in the reorientation of development 
depends to a large extent on the structures on 
which they are based. Thus, the market could 
play a role in the efficient orientation of produc-
tion and consumption if it were based on an 
economic structure in which wealth and income 
are distributed in an equitable manner. Simi-
larly, in order to be the proper expression of the 
interests and demands of the majority of the 
population, the State apparatus must not only 
be based on a democratic political system but 
must also democratize itself. 
In this respect, in order to achieve a » 
higher degree of efficiency and legitimacy many 
Latín American States should improve their per-
formance as regards co-ordination and concer-
tation. Co-ordination refers above all to the 
need for the State apparatus as a whole —cen-
tral and regional, administrative and decen-
tralized— to have a co-ordinated manner of op-
eration. There can be no doubt that in some 
countries of the region the effects of the crisis 
have been aggravated because of the disjointed 
action of the State apparatus, which of course re-
flects riot only the existence of technical and 
political problems but also, and above all, sec-
toral bureaucratic interests in the main public 
sector institutions and enterprises. Concertation 
is connected in particular with the capacity of 
the State apparatus to reflect the interests of so-
cial groups, orient their action and unite their 
will for the purpose of achieving common objec-
tives. While the co-ordination of the State ap-
paratus is a necessary and principal condition 
for its efficiency, concertation lies at the heart of 
the legitimacy of the State in pluralistic mixed-
economy societies like the majority of those in 
Latin America. As is well known, co-ordination 
and concertation form the essence of planning, 
which has a fresh opportunity to show its useful-
ness in the present circumstances of Latin 
America. 
There can be no possible concertation 
without institutional machinery which permits 
and guarantees the participation of the various 
social groups in all important State decisions. 
Thus, in order to control the authoritarian and 
technocratic tendencies which usually arise 
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among those responsible for running the State 
apparatus it is necessary to consolidate the 
democratic institutions: only these can prevent 
State intervention from being merely the ex-
pression of the arbitrary desires of powerful 
groups, whether they be civil or military, State 
or private. As already noted, however, the re-
turn to democracy does not guarantee that a 
satisfactory degree of efficiency will be achieved 
in State action: the contrary could take place if 
all the social groups believe that this return is a 
suitable opportunity for ensuring that their own 
unfulfilled demands are satisfied. This is a cru-
cial issue, since the 'ungovernability' of democ-
racies has always been the main justification 
adopted by authoritarian régimes. 
For both valuative and practical reasons, 
democracy is the most suitable framework for 
development, but it must ensure an orderly per-
formance which, by the very nature of this polit-
ical system, cannot be based only or even mainly 
on coercion, but above all on the spontaneous 
consent of the governed. The support which the 
governed give to democratic institutions and the 
decisions which emerge from the latter depend 
on at least two essential conditions, however: 
firstly, participation in the decisions must be on 
a broad scale and these decisions must be con-
nected with the great national problems, and 
secondly, the democratic institutions must re-
main in force for a prolonged period in order 
that they may be consolidated as the pillars of 
political tradition. Strong democratic institu-
tions can be of great assistance in helping the 
citizens to overcome the effects of the conflicts 
and imbalances which accompany all crise^. 
Policies for tackling the crisis and reorient-
ing development call for dramatic decisions 
which, as already noted, will profoundly alter 
the economies and societies of the Latin Ameri-
can countries. These decisions, in turn, call for a 
State which is capable of carrying them out, and 
this capacity not only implies that the State must 
attain maximum efficiency in its action, but also 
and above all, that it must achieve a social con-
sensus which will serve as its political support; 
without this support the State will be simply an 
instrument of sectoral interests and will not be 
able to carry out the task with which the present 
challenge faces it. 
Furthermore, in societies like those of 
Latin America, where democratic ideals are 
deeply rooted, the social consensus will not be 
achieved by force, but only by the spontaneous 
and responsible obedience of the governed. 
This, in its turn, will only result from full par-
ticipation in the taking of decisions and from 
the inner conviction that the sacrifices which 
have to be imposed are inevitable and are dis-
tributed equitably among all.11 
" i n his analysis of the present situation in Spain, 
which combines the need to face a crisis with the need to 
strengthen democracy, Fuentes Quintana has put forward 
some suggestions which seem to be largely valid also for 
most of the Latin American countries. 
"It is evident that a policy designed to adjust to the 
crisis seems to call for the fulfilment of three vital condi-
tions: clear recognition of the situation (telling the country the 
truth, not concealing the crisis as though it were an incurable 
disease of which it is better not to speak); transparency and 
equity in the distribution of its heavy costs (the crisis cannot be 
passed on to others in an impossible and suicidal kind of 
sauve qui peut); and the creation or achievement of a sense of 
common purpose on the part of all social and political 
groups in order to reach constructive answers to the main prob-
lems through negotiation and agreement. In other words, over-
coming the economic crisis and bulding democracy is a pol-
icy which calls for a high sense of the importance of the 
State rather than of one's own party in the approaches to it 
and the solutions proposed for the different problems by 
the social and political groups. If this sense of common pur-
pose is not created, if the political parties foment a desper-
ate class struggle in the midst of the crisis, if entrepreneurs 
and workers fail to define the minimum conditions for mak-
ing possible the development of the country's enterprises, if 
those who enjoy privileged economic positions refuse to 
have anything to do with solutions calling for some sacrifice 
on their part, then the crisis will get worse and will make it 
insolubly difficult to cope with this combination of a crisis 
plus the need to build democracy, on which the whole fu-
ture of Spain depends." Enrique Fuentes Quintana, "La 
prioridad política de la economía en la transición española", 
Pensamiento Iberoamericano, No. 3, Madrid, January-June 
1983,p.l27. 
